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''The Modern Corporation and Private Property'' is a book written by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published in 1932 regarding the foundations of United States corporate law. It explores the evolution of big business through a legal and economic lens, and argues that in the modern world those who legally have ownership over companies have been separated from their control. The second, revised edition was released in 1967. It serves as a foundational text in corporate governance, corporate law (company law), and institutional economics. Berle and Means argued that the structure of corporate law in the United States in the 1930s enforced the separation of ownership and control because the corporate person formally owns a corporate entity even while shareholders own shares in the corporate entity and elect corporate directors who control the company's activities. Compared to the notion of personal private property, say as one's laptop or bicycle, the functioning of modern company law “has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property”. This occurred for a number of reasons, foremost being the dispersal of shareholding ownership in big corporations: the typical shareholder is uninterested in the day-to-day affairs of the company, yet thousands of people like him or her make up the majority of owners throughout the economy. The result is that those who are directly interested in day-to-day affairs, the management and the directors, have the ability to manage the resources of companies to their own advantage without effective shareholder scrutiny. “The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capital... (owners ) have surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest...” 〔at 355 of the 1932 edition〕 Berle and Means researched the consequences of ownership and control being separate. As businesses grow and shareholders increase in number, any shareholdings that directors have will be a proportionally smaller capital stake. Directors' income will derive mostly from return on their labor as directors, not from their capital investment. If their motivation is purely pecuniary “the owners most emphatically will not be served by a profit seeking controlling group”.〔114〕 The implications of their work were clear. Berle and Means advocated embedded voting rights for all shareholders, greater transparency, and accountability. However, with the release of the revised edition, Berle and Means also pointed to the disparity that existed between those who did have shareholdings and those who did not. ==Introductory== ;Introduction by Murray Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen Murray Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen have added their introduction to more recent editions of the text. It casts a thoroughly skeptical perspective on the book, since the two came from very different academic perspectives, generally more orthodox and conservative in their outlook politically. ;Property, Production and Revolution - A Preface to the Revised Edition by Adolf A. Berle〔This was an article published separately and earlier as AA Berle, 'Property, Production and Revolution' (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1〕 For the 1967 Revised Edition, Berle added a new Preface, updating the picture and bringing in new arguments and observations. He summed up the whole point of the book at the same time, making it a valuable adjunct to the text. "Why have stockholders?" he asked.
The position of stockholders' profit, said Berle,
;Implications of the Corporate Revolution in Economic Theory by Gardiner C. Means ;Preface (1932) ;Tables and charts 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「The Modern Corporation and Private Property」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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